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Can governments that introduce extreme austerity measures survive elections? Contrary to 
economic voting expectations, the PASOK government in Greece initially appeared to cope 
quite well, claiming victory in regional elections in 2010 despite widespread anti-austerity 
protest. In this paper, we interpret this result with the help of a post-election survey, which 
also covered future voting intention. The explanatory power of models based on theories of 
economic voting and blame attribution as well as the electoral impact of the government’s 
representation of the crisis as an existential threat are assessed. Our analysis challenges the 
interpretation of the 2010 election as an indication of support for PASOK’s austerity policies 
and reveals weaknesses in its support base, which help contextualise its downfall in the 2012 
Parliamentary elections. The paper also underlines the importance of studying the impact of 
crises discourses on voting choice, particularly since blame attribution receives little support 
in this case. 
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Introduction 
The question of how political parties fare electorally after implementing austerity measures 
has been analysed over many decades, with welfare state retrenchment seen as a major risk 
factor. Despite increasing inequality and social tensions, the global financial crisis appears to 
be bad news for left-wing parties in government, with electoral defeats suffered by the 
Democrats in the USA and Labour in the UK during 2010 and Socialist parties in Portugal and 
Spain in 2011. There thus appears to be a strong prima facie case that the main electoral 
impact of the financial crisis consists of an anti-incumbent effect, with voters punishing 
whoever is in power at the time when decisions imposing severe austerity measures were 
made.  
 
Such an interpretation would add renewed weight to the macroeconomic voting argument: 
voters will tend to reward the incumbent if the economy performs well during the election 
cycle but many will drop their support if the economy performs poorly. Yet, the literature on 
the electoral impact of austerity measures has shown that such a punishment is not automatic. 
Cross-national and cross-temporal studies find only an inconsistent or weak influence of 
economic voting (Powell and Whitten, 1993; Duch and Stevenson, 2008). Apart from 
contextual factors, such as institutional features (Powell and Whitten, 1993) and political 
conditions (Bengtsson, 2004), blame attribution has emerged as a crucial parameter in 
conditioning the ability of government parties to survive economic downturns and welfare 
state retrenchment. Governments that are successful in managing blame and convince voters 
that any measures, however painful, were not their fault, apparently can do well electorally 
(Vis and Van Kersbergen, 2007; Giger and Nelson, 2011). 
 
The current economic crisis and the extreme austerity policies that have been implemented in 
various European countries provide a new impetus to test classical theories, such as economic 
voting and blame attribution, but also go beyond them. One factor that requires further 
elaboration in this context is the political discourse governments employ to justify the largely 
unpopular policy decisions taken. This commonly involves presenting austerity as the only 
possible solution to the crisis and acceptance of the measures as a matter of national survival 
(Clarke and Newman, 2012). Employing the rhetoric of existential threats is broadly 
equivalent to what in the international security literature is known as a ‘securitisation’ attempt 
(Wæver, 1995). The central aim of this paper is thus to examine the importance of government 
discourses for electoral behaviour: how decisive is the extent to which a government can 
prevail in framing contests over its opponents and dominate political discourse in swaying 
voting decisions at times of crisis, controlling for economic evaluations, ideology and blame 
attribution? 
 
No national setting is better suited to analyse this question than Greece where the entire 
economy is in a severe crisis and virtually all citizens are adversely affected. The left-of-centre 
party PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement), which came to office in 2009, negotiated a 
‘bail-out’ agreement with the European Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) in May 2010 in return for unprecedented austerity measures. Despite general strikes 
bringing life to a halt and demonstrators rioting in front of Parliament, the Greek government 
appeared to have done rather well in its first electoral test in the form of local and regional 
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elections that took place in November 2010.
1
 Prime Minister George Papandreou had 
attempted to turn the elections into a referendum on his austerity policies. With overall results 
showing that PASOK lost support but remained the strongest party, he was able to claim 
victory and a renewed mandate for his policies. Nevertheless, this apparent electoral success in 
2010 did not prevent the eventual fall of the Papandreou government, the formation of a 
coalition involving both major parties, and the collapse of PASOK’s poll rating, leading to 
major losses in the general elections of 2012. 
 
To understand these electoral developments and their broader comparative and theoretical 
implications, we analyse survey evidence representative of the Greek adult population that 
was collected in early December 2010, shortly after the regional elections had taken place. 
One way to examine the significance of this result is to compare the determinants of voting in 
the regional elections with the voting intention in a future general election. To what extent was 
the acceptance of the government’s security discourse an important factor for voters in 2010 
that may have enabled PASOK to withstand punishment for its austerity measures in the 
regional elections? What evidence, if any, was there already in 2010 about cracks in the 
support for PASOK that may help explain its eventual downfall? In order to answer these 
questions, we draw on theories of economic voting, blame attribution and the impact of 
government discourses on austerity, testing our model of vote choice with reference to two 
types of dependent variables: actual (recalled) vote in the regional elections of November 
2010 and voting intention in a future general election.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. We first discuss a range of theoretical perspectives 
potentially relevant to explaining the determinants of support for the incumbent party when 
the latter applies austerity measures, a question that is far from being settled. This is followed 
by a discussion of the data and the methodology used. As the questions of blame attribution 
and political discourse are of central importance, we then have a closer look at the structure of 
the attitudes of voters on these issues, before discussing the main results of our analysis on the 
determinants of electoral choices in Greece in 2010. 
 
 
Theory: Economic Voting and Conditioning Effects 
Any discussion of the electoral politics of extreme austerity has to start with theories of 
economic voting, which have played a dominant role in the electoral literature since the 1980s 
(cf. Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2007). The general notion of this approach is that voters 
punish the incumbent government party for worsening economic conditions. The dominance 
of the standard reward-punishment model of voting would be confirmed if economic 
evaluations determined voting behaviour also in cases of extreme economic strain.  
 
                                                 
1
 The 2010 local and regional elections were held on 7 November (first round) and 14 
November (second round). Separate ballots were used to elect representatives for 325 
municipalities and 13 regions. PASOK-supported candidates won control of seven regions and 
gained 43.6% of the council seats, thus allowing PASOK to claim victory (see Gemenis, 
2012). For the remainder of the paper, the focus is on regional elections, which is a better 
indicator of support for particular political parties. 
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The literature distinguishes between different ways in which voters can evaluate the economic 
situation: sociotropic vs. egocentric, and retrospective vs. prospective (see Evans and 
Andersen, 2006). Yet, while a wide variety of studies have applied and tested these concepts, 
no consensus has emerged in terms of which of them could be expected to be associated with 
what particular economic circumstances. Previous analyses of voting in Greece (Nezi 2012; 
Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2012; Lobo and Lewis-Beck 2012) have used sociotropic 
retrospective economic assessments, but these analyses apply only to periods up to 2008, 
preceding the austerity crisis. In the Greece of 2010, we considered the sociotropic 
retrospective dimension to be irrelevant as the extremely severe nature of the downturn in the 
general economic situation is not in doubt. The egocentric retrospective element, on the other 
hand, may be pertinent to our inquiry as the economic impact of the crisis at the individual 
level may show some significant variation. On the prospective front, expectations about future 
personal as well as national economic developments could also be expected to play a key role 
in voting decisions.  
 
One aspect that is of particular interest here is whether voters may use different criteria to 
evaluate the economy, depending on the type of election held. On this, most influential has 
been Reif and Schmitt’s (1980) distinction between ‘first order’ and ‘second order’ elections, 
with local and regional elections usually regarded as ‘second order’. The key predictions are 
that ‘second order’ elections have a lower turnout, favour smaller and new political parties, 
and are likely to see incumbents punished. In terms of economic voting, we would expect the 
relevant economic evaluations in second order elections will be predominantly retrospective 
rather than prospective, an approach adopted by most empirical analyses of such elections 
(Lohmann et al., 1997; Gaines and Crombez, 2004; Gélineau and Bélanger, 2005). This is 
because in regional elections, voters can be thought to be “sending a message” to an existing 
government that will continue to be in office (cf. Kellermann, 2008). By contrast, voters asked 
about the voting intention in a general election may give a higher consideration to prospective 
economic evaluations.  
 
In Greece, local and regional elections are typically seen as ‘second order’ and voters do not 
directly choose parties but only lists that are supported by parties. In 2010, much of the 
campaigning was indeed directed at local issues (Gemenis, 2010). In some instances, however, 
voters may not automatically perceive regional and local elections as ‘second order’ (Johns, 
2011; Ervik, 2012). This may be particularly true in the Greek case, since two weeks before 
Election Day, Papandreou announced that he would call a snap general election if voters were 
not expressing sufficient support for PASOK candidates. In presenting the regional vote as a 
referendum on the government’s austerity programme, he clearly attempted to turn it into a 
contest of national importance, with potentially immediate effects on the future of the national 
government. Our analysis of the determinants of vote choice can thus also help determine the 
extent to which this attempt was successful and therefore assess the broader implications of 
the 2010 result. A vote for the government party PASOK strongly influenced by support for 
the government’s austerity discourses could be interpreted as the regional elections 
predominantly having the character of ‘first order’ elections. A strong influence of 
retrospective economic voting may indicate a strong ‘second order’ character. If neither 
economic voting nor other factors connected to the austerity crisis are important, then Greeks 
made their choice on local or other factors. 
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Following the previous literature on the effects of contextual conditions on economic voting 
(Powell and Whitten, 1993; Anderson, 2000; Bengtsson, 2004; Hellwig and Samuels, 2007), 
we can expect that objective changes in a country’s or an individual’s economic circumstances 
are not the main predictor of an incumbent’s electoral fortunes. It is the perception of actual 
economic performance that is of key importance (Tilley et al., 2008). Furthermore, the 
attribution of responsibility has been shown to play a crucial conditioning effect in the 
relationship between economic evaluations and vote choice: only voters who blame the 
government for the economic problems are likely to vote according to their economic 
evaluations (Vis, 2009; Hellwig and Coffey, 2011;  Giger and Nelson, 2011). 
 
A particularly potent strategy for governments to minimise electoral costs at times of crisis is 
to attribute responsibility for economic conditions to exogenous factors (Powell and Whitten, 
1993; Hart and Tindall, 2009). Vis and van Kersbergen, writing several years before the 
Eurozone crisis, suggested that the removal of control over monetary policy from the nation 
state to the European level offers a new opportunity to pursue such a strategy: ‘The European 
Central Bank emerges as the cause of tied hands and consequently blame can be shifted’ (Vis 
and van Kersbergen, 2007, p. 167). More recently, Lobo and Lewis-Beck (2012) showed that 
the perception of the EU rather than national governments being responsible for economic 
problems led to reduced levels of economic voting in Southern Europe.  
 
Studies evaluating the effect of economic globalisation on voting behaviour find similar 
patterns (Hellwig, 2001). Countries that are most integrated into the global economy and are 
subsequently perceived to be less able to exercise control over economic affairs experience a 
lower degree of economic voting (Fernandez Albertos, 2006; Hellwig and Samuels, 2007; 
Duch and Stevenson, 2008, 2010). In the Greek case, we would thus expect that voters who do 
not blame the government for the economic crisis and instead hold foreign actors such as the 
European Union or Germany responsible, are more likely to support the governing party, 
PASOK.  
 
Further to blame attribution, a closely related aspect of framing concerns the ability of the 
government to deflect electoral costs for unpopular welfare state retrenchment by a policy of 
‘blame avoidance’. This concept has dominated the literature on the politics of welfare state 
reform since the early 1990s,
2
 and various types of blame avoidance strategies have been 
identified (Weaver, 1986; Hering, 2008). In the politics of extreme austerity, perhaps the most 
successful blame avoidance strategy is to promote a narrative of the country facing an urgent, 
existential threat and with economic policies forced on the government to which there are no 
alternatives (Weaver, 1986). We would thus expect the ability of the government to control 
political discourse and define austerity as being inevitable to be crucial in determining its 
electoral prospects (Hart and Tindall, 2009).  
 
Using the rhetoric of existential threat to legitimise extraordinary responses is known in the 
international security literature is a ‘securitisation’ attempt (Wæver, 1995). Elites that can 
                                                 
2
 Cf. Pierson, 1994, 2001; Starke, 2006; Vis and Van Kersbergen, 2007; Giger and Nelson, 
2011. 
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successfully, by means of an argument, convince an audience that there is an imminent threat 
to the survival of a key (national) value, are able to ‘break free of procedures’ they would 
otherwise be bound by (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 26). Compelling cognitive-psychological 
evidence shows that individuals are predisposed to accept such political arguments that 
emphasise avoiding losses, rather than realizing gains (Kahneman and Tversky 2000; 
Arceneaux, 2012). Therefore, as Weyland (2003, pp. 823-824) argues, deep crises and 
people’s strong loss-aversion biases induce them ‘to support bold, draconian, painful, and 
risky stabilization plans that promise a quick recovery’, even when these have highly 
uncertain prospects of success. 
 
Employing such security discourse was the cornerstone of Papandreou’s strategy of 
maintaining adequate levels of support for the austerity measures, repeatedly arguing that ‘we 
are in a race against time to keep our economy alive’ and that ‘the country is in a state of war’ 
(The Guardian, 3 March 2010). As the Finance Minister George Papakonstantinou 
characteristically put it on the day the first bail-out agreement was signed (BBC News, 2 May 
2010), the choice was “between collapse and salvation”. The message to voters is therefore 
that they should support the government’s measures regardless of how severe or even unfair 
these may be because the alternative would be far more catastrophic for the Greek economy 
and society. Exploiting the psychological cognitive predisposition of avoiding losses or other 
threats to survival may therefore provide the greatest legitimation for welfare retrenchment 
and act as a potent strategy for the incumbent to attract electoral support. We would thus 
expect that voters who accept the government’s security discourse that the austerity policies 
are necessary for national survival are more likely to support the government party. 
 
In evaluating the role of economic assessments, blame attributions and the acceptance of 
government discourses, we face the challenge of endogeneity. Economic assessments could be 
expected to be influenced by party choice (cf. Anderson, 2007; Tilley et al. 2008). PASOK 
voters may express a more hopeful view of the economic future of Greece as a way to provide 
a justification for their continued support of the party. Also blame attributions and evaluation 
of discourses could be expected to follow partisan cues (cf. Malhotra and Kuo 2007; Malhotra 
and Margalit 2010). In the absence of a panel design, which constitutes one of the main 
attempts to control for endogeneity (cf. Fraile and Lewis-Beck, 2010), we use a number of 
strategies to assess the extent to which our results might be affected by this problem. 
 
First, we control for party identification with three variables measuring how close respondents 
consider themselves to be to the main parties, PASOK, ND and the parties of the far left. 
Several studies have highlighted the interrelationships between economic evaluations and 
partisanship (Rudolph, 2003; Marsh and Tilley 2010; Tilley and Hobolt, 2011). Partisanship 
may provide a perceptual screen through which voters attribute blame, assess economic 
conditions and consider political discourses (Campbell et al., 1960; Evans and Andersen, 
2006) and we thus need to control for it. 
 
Secondly, we control for a number of other variables that could be expected to determine vote 
choice, such as age, gender, education, trade union membership, and political ideology (left-
right placement). Do we find any statistically significant effects of economic voting, blame 
attribution and austerity discourses, once we control for these variables? Finally, we test our 
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hypotheses not only with a binary logistic regression contrasting PASOK voters with voters of 
other parties and abstainers but also by carrying out multinomial logistic regressions to 
examine the extent to which the effect of economic voting, blame attribution and austerity 
discourses varies between different vote choices, including non-voting. 
 
Apart from serving as controls, ideological variables are also important on their own right for 
reasons to do with the specific socio-political context. PASOK started with a radical socialist 
programme after the end of the military dictatorship but mellowed in later years, promoting an 
agenda of ‘modernisation’ which was unsuccessfully challenged by traditionalists 
(Featherstone, 2005; Lyrintzis, 2005). The radical economic measures adopted by the PASOK 
government in response to the debt crisis further distanced the party from its traditional, 
socialist core. The greatest challenge to the government’s discourse is thus likely to come 
from left-wing forces. 
 
Related to this is the question about the electoral relevance of involvement in trade unions and 
anti-austerity protests. Despite PASOK’s historically strong ties with the trade unions, more so 
than any other party in Greece (Mavrogordatos, 1997), the central involvement of trade unions 
in the organisation of a series of general strikes and demonstrations against the government’s 
austerity measures could be expected to have undermined their loyalty to PASOK. We would 
thus expect that voters who position themselves ideologically on the Left, participated in 
protest actions and are trade union members would be more likely to vote for parties to the left 
of PASOK.  
 
Finally, one aspect of voting behaviour that goes beyond party choice is non-voting.
3
 A central 
part of the electoral politics of austerity could be anticipated to be political alienation and 
‘anti-politics’, leading to a loss of support and an ‘anti-party’ sentiment (e.g. Poguntke, 1996; 
Dalton, 2004). The question is to what extent non-participation in the electoral process can be 
seen as a product of a general political disinterest that may have preceded the austerity crisis 
or an active form of protest. Examining the effect of political interest and education should 
help us interpret the motivation of those who did not participate in the regional elections and 
of those who reported they intended not to vote in a general election.  
 
In order to assess the effects of economic and political evaluations on vote choice at times of 
extreme crisis, we present two separate analyses, namely of actual (recalled) voting behaviour 
in the regional elections in Greece that took place in November 2010 and of voting intention 
in a future general election. Both are different phenomena but the comparison of the two 
should shed further light on the interpretation of the 2010 regional election results. Was 
Papandreou successful in turning these into a ‘first order’ election, with voters indicating, 
‘referendum-style’, whether or not they supported his austerity policies, or were these 
predominantly a ‘second order’ election, of no direct significance for the fate of the national 
government? If the determinants of voting behaviour for the regional elections are essentially 
                                                 
3
 According to Article 51 of the Greek constitution, voting is compulsory. While non-voting 
was never effectively sanctioned, in 2001 the provision to impose sanctions was removed 
from the Constitution, thus making the obligation to vote merely an aspiration, see 
Malkopoulou 2011, p. 206.  
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the same as of voting intention in a general election, we could conclude that the ‘referendum’ 
aspect was, indeed, the dominant feature. If however there are major differences, particularly 
in the importance of the government’s discourse, blame attribution and economic voting, 
when other aspects such as party identification are controlled, then the relative success of 
PASOK in 2010 will in itself be of less comparative value for austerity politics. 
 
 
 
Data 
A telephone survey was conducted by Kappa Research, Athens, in early December 2010.
4
 A 
stratified quota method was used to survey the adult Greek population, aiming to be 
representative of all Greek citizens aged 18 and above. The quota system ensured that the 
sample reflected the results of the last (2001) Greek census in terms of age, gender and 
regional distribution. One interview was conducted per household, with dialling codes selected 
randomly with the aid of computer software. In this way, a dataset with 1014 valid responses 
was generated. 
 
For the purposes of analysing electoral behaviour, we compared survey responses to actual 
results in the regional elections that had taken place shortly before the survey was conducted. 
This revealed some disparities. Voters in the Attica region as well as PASOK voters were 
overrepresented while the share of non-voters was far lower than it should have been 
according to the official election statistics. An attempt was therefore made to weigh the data to 
match them as closely as possible to the actual results of the 2010 regional elections, region by 
region. All analyses of regional election behaviour presented in this paper are based on data 
weighted to reflect the actual results of the 2010 regional elections in terms of the share of 
voters in the 13 regions, turnout and the choice of parties.  
 
According to our calculations based on official election returns
5
, PASOK won 34.6% of valid 
votes, ND 32.6%, KKE 10.9%, and SYRIZA 4.5%. As 39.1% did not vote and a further 5.5% 
returned a blank or spoilt vote, the 2010 result indicated that PASOK had lost a lot of support. 
In terms of the share of the vote in relation to all registered voters, PASOK had received the 
support of 30.3% in the 2009 general elections but only 19.2% in the 2010 regional elections. 
An analysis of voter movements between 2009 and 2010 reveals that relatively few 2009 
PASOK voters had switched their support to other parties: just 7% had voted for the second 
main party, ND, and 6% had voted for parties of the left, with non-voters forming the biggest 
group of PASOK defectors with 29%.  
 
                                                 
4
 The research was funded by the British Academy under its small grants programme; 
Principal Investigator: Georgios Karyotis. The financial support of the British Academy is 
gratefully acknowledged. More details, including the questionnaire and a replication dataset, 
can be found on the project website, http://www.AusterityPolitics.com.  
5
 Own calculations on the basis of election results in each of the 13 regions, as published by 
the Ministry of the Interior; http://ekloges-prev.singularlogic.eu/dn2010/index.html [accessed 
20 April 2011] 
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Turning to voting intention in future national parliamentary elections, the picture was quite 
similar. Few 2009 PASOK voters defected to either ND or the other left-wing opposition 
parties. 27% of former PASOK voters said they would not vote, 9% indicated a blank or spoilt 
vote, and 17% said they were undecided. Overall, only 40% of respondents indicated a party 
preference, and just 12.6% said they would vote PASOK in a future general election. This 
percentage is quite close to the actual share of the vote achieved by PASOK in the May 2012 
(13.2%) and June 2012 (12.4%) parliamentary elections.
6
 
 
In the remainder of the paper, we first try to model voting choice in the regional elections and 
then continue to analyse voting intention in a future national election. Before we explore these 
in greater detail, we have to discuss the structure of public attitudes to the austerity crisis, 
which will define some of the independent variables to be used in the analysis. 
 
 
Blame attribution and austerity discourses 
In order to analyse the dimensionality of attitudes to the ‘blame’ question, which previous 
studies of the electoral consequences of welfare state cuts have considered to be crucial, we 
invited all respondents to indicate whom they blame for the economic crisis from a range of 
institutions in Greece and abroad. The results of a principal-components (factor) analysis are 
summarised in Table 1.
7
 
 
--- Table 1 about here ---- 
 
Three factors were identified from this. The first factor mainly loads on allocating blame to 
foreign economic and political actors, such as the European Union, Germany, foreign 
investors and ‘globalisation’ generally. 42% of respondents (moderately or extremely) blamed 
the EU, 50% Germany, 66% foreign investors/speculators but only 34% the Euro.  
 
The second factor is mainly defined by blame attached to Greek governments. About 41% 
(moderately or extremely) blamed the PASOK government that came into power 2009, and 
64% blamed the ND government that was in office from 2004 to 2009. Interestingly, blaming 
the PASOK government loads on the same factor as blaming the ND government. Irrespective 
of which party is to blame, placing responsibility on the large parties constitutes a dimension 
of its own. 
 
The third dimension of blame attribution is mainly defined by reference to corruption in 
Greece and the responsibility of individual Greek citizens. 74% of respondents blame 
corruption as ‘extremely’ responsible for the economic crisis, while the perception of the 
blame attached to ‘each and every one of us’ is rather more varied, with just 20% placing 
everybody in the category of those ‘extremely’ responsible.  
                                                 
6
 Official election results published by the Ministry of the Interior, see http://ekloges.ypes.gr  
[accessed 12 November 2012] 
7
 In order to limit the number of missing cases, in particular for the subsequent regression 
analyses, we allocated a neutral response (3 on a 1-5 scale) to all non-respondents. This did 
not affect the overall result of the factor analysis.  
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Turning from the allocation of blame to broader attitudes on austerity, we constructed a 
battery of questions that was mainly intended to capture the level of agreement with the 
discourse promoted by the government but also included items that are an essential part of the 
opposition discourse, such as the question of the fairness of the distribution of the burden of 
the austerity measures. The results show that Greeks are deeply divided: 46% of the 
population agrees that the austerity measures are necessary for the country’s survival but 41% 
disagree. In order to analyse the dimensionality of attitudes, we again conducted a principal-
component analysis, and the results are displayed in Table 2.  
 
--- Table 2 about here --- 
 
This analysis also resulted in three factors. The first factor appears to be a good measurement 
of the level of agreement (or disagreement) with the government discourse. The main 
elements the factor loads on are the reference to ‘national survival’ and the lack of any 
alternative course of action for the government. 39% agree that the government had no option 
but to introduce these measures; 54% state that the crisis can be seen as an opportunity to 
move forward. Also a negative attitude to protest loads on this factor but only 24% of 
respondents disagreed with the statement that people should protest against austerity 
measures. Two-thirds of respondents agreed that people should protest, which also includes 
some of those who considered the austerity policies as unavoidable. 
 
The second and third factors mainly load on one statement only, namely that ‘nothing’ can be 
done to resolve the crisis for the second factor and the unfairness of the distribution of the 
burden of the austerity policy for the third factor. The second factor indicates a feeling of 
‘fatalism’ that even a change of government would not make any difference, and that Greece 
is helpless and unable to do anything to recover from the dire economic situation it has found 
itself in. However, only a fairly small minority, 18% of respondents, take that attitude.  
 
The third factor provides an indication of the perception of unfairness. This is a major element 
of the opposition discourse and indicates an attitude that is very widespread in Greece: 89% of 
respondents agree or strongly agree with this statement, 51% strongly agree. The government 
in 2010 clearly had not succeeded in convincing its own supporters that the burden of austerity 
was distributed fairly. It is perhaps surprising that this variable does not load strongly on the 
first factor representing the main dimension of support of and opposition to the government 
discourses on the austerity programme. Again, as in the case of attitudes to protest, we find 
that a substantial number of people who considered the austerity policies to be without 
alternative and necessary for national survival agree with the statement that the burden of the 
measures is not distributed fairly.  
 
The main question we are interested in is the impact of these attitudes on voting behaviour. To 
what extent does blame attribution and the nature of public attitudes to the austerity 
programme affect the way people voted in the regional elections and their voting intention in a 
future general election at the end of 2010?  
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Determinants of voting choice 
Having generated a number of factors that represent the main dimensions of the thinking of 
voters on the austerity measures, we can now proceed to our models of their electoral choice. 
Separate models were estimated for the behaviour of voters in the November 2010 regional 
elections (Table 3) and their voting intention in a future parliamentary election at national 
level, as recorded in our survey conducted in December 2010 (Table 4). The main independent 
variables are designed to test the theories outlined earlier in this paper; details of question 
wording and coding are given in the Appendix. In each case, we first estimate two binary 
logistic regression models, in which 2010 PASOK voters are contrasted with all others, 
including non-voters. In the first model (column 1), we only enter variables representing 
economic voting, blame attribution and attitudes to the austerity crisis. In the second model, 
controls are added to assess the extent to which any effects found in the first model are 
independent of factors such as party identification, ideology and socio-demographics.  
 
In the second stage, the binary logistic regressions are supplemented by the results of 
multinomial logistic regressions, in which 2010 PASOK voters are the reference category. 
Voters of other parties or independent candidates, non-voters and, in the case of voting 
intention, those that declare themselves to be ‘undecided’, are compared with 2010 PASOK 
voters.
8
 
 
--- Tables 3 and 4 about here --- 
 
 
What did we find? Starting with economic voting, our analysis sheds doubt on the universal 
applicability of the economic voting model. For voting PASOK in the regional elections, only 
future economic expectations were significant predictors of voting choice in the model 
without controls. The co-efficient is not statistically significant any more once control 
variables are applied. The result of the multinomial logistic regression showed that this is also 
true for all categories of voting choice. We could thus not find any support for the notion that 
voters in the regional elections would vote according to their retrospective economic 
evaluation. Overall, concerns about the national economy did not weight particularly heavily 
when voters made their choice in regional elections. The situation is very different, however, 
when it comes to voting intention in elections at national level: here, economic expectations 
are a major factor, both in terms of retrospective and prospective evaluations. PASOK voters 
have a less negative view of their past economic experience and more positive expectations 
                                                 
8
 In our multinomial regression models, we are constrained in our analysis by the low number 
of cases associated with some electoral choices, requiring a slight simplification of the 
dependent variables used. For regional elections, we contrast PASOK voters (N=182) with 
ND voters (N=171), voters for parties left of PASOK, i.e. KKE, SYRIZA and DIMAR 
(N=92), those voting for independent or smaller parties (N=32) and those who did not vote at 
all or returned an invalid vote (blank or spoilt, N=420, all weighted). For voting intention, the 
same categories were created, with the addition of a new category for ‘undecided’ voters 
(PASOK voters, N=178; ND N=91; Far Left N=111; Undecided N=186; Non-voters N=382). 
The category of voters intending to vote for a range of small parties (N=51) was removed. 
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about the economic future, while the reverse applies to most of those intending to vote for 
other parties or not intending to vote at all.
9
 
 
Turning to blame attribution and political discourses, not blaming Greek governments but 
blaming civil society are significant predictors of a PASOK vote in regional elections, 
although the co-efficient for blaming civil society is not statistically significant once control 
variables are included. However, contrary to expectations and the dominant assumption in the 
literature, we find that questions of blame attribution do not have a significant impact on 
voting intentions at national level. Even more impressive is the rejection of the hypothesis that 
blaming foreign actors, such as the European Union, would have an impact on voting choice. 
For both regional and national elections, it is very clear that this variable plays no role 
whatsoever. 
 
Turning to attitudes to the austerity crisis, the main variable that makes a difference is the 
acceptance of the government discourse on the necessity and inescapability of the austerity 
measures. This is a significant predictor for voting PASOK in regional elections. Its impact is 
particularly impressive in the various models of voting intention at national level for the whole 
range of electoral choices. The inclusion of control variables reduces the size of the effect but 
it remains statistically significant. There is little difference in the degree of opposition to the 
government discourse among different groups of voters not supporting PASOK in national 
elections. By contrast, neither a fatalistic attitude nor concern about the unfair nature of the 
distribution of the burden of the austerity programme figure as significant predictors for voting 
choice.  
 
Of potential political importance are the results on the firm rejection of the government’s 
securitisation discourse not only by those who supported the parties further to the left of the 
spectrum but also by the group of ‘undecided’ voters. Most PASOK ‘defectors’ who voted for 
the party in the 2009 general elections did not switch their voting intention to other parties but 
declared themselves to be ‘undecided’ or indicated they would not vote at all. In our survey, 
undecided voters are as committed to an alternative discourse as the supporters of left-wing 
parties and non-voters. Despite the relatively good result that PASOK achieved in the regional 
elections, these results on the determinants of the voting intention variables demonstrate the 
difficulties PASOK was already facing in winning back previous voters who had turned their 
back on the government party.  
 
Similar conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of non-voting. For regional elections, non-
voting is mainly explained by a combination of rejection of the government discourse on 
austerity, blaming Greek governments, not having a member of a trade union in the household, 
having attended university and not identifying with PASOK. Thus, in the regional elections, 
there is a strong political dimension. For national voting intention, in addition to attitudes to 
government’s discourse and lack of party identification with PASOK, there is also a strong 
effect of economic voting and of lack of political interest, while trade union membership and 
                                                 
9
 These findings apply to sociotropic prospective evaluations only. Expectations about the 
personal financial situation (egocentric prospective evaluations) had no impact on voting 
behaviour (results not shown). 
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education are not significant predictors. Those intending not to vote in a general election are 
as alienated as others not supporting PASOK; compared with the ‘undecided’, a lack of 
political interest sets non-voters apart, while in comparison with ND and Far Left voters, non-
voters do not locate clearly on either left or right in the political spectrum. On balance, it 
appears that non-voters have become decoupled from the party political system in general and 
may be difficult to motivate to take part in future elections. Our survey points thus towards a 
dominant interpretation of ‘non-voting’ as a function of lack of political interest rather than 
activism. 
 
Looking at other ‘control’ variables for possible alternative explanations of electoral support, 
we find that left-right positioning is important for ND and Far Left voters, particularly for 
national voting intentions. Perhaps the only unexpected findings are the roles of trade union 
membership and participation in anti-austerity protest. For regional elections, union 
membership is a statistically significant predictor for voting PASOK and negatively associated 
with voting ND or non-voting, while for voting intention it is insignificant. Despite the fact 
that unions played a very important role in organising anti-austerity protest, the main effect is 
thus still in support for PASOK. Also having taken part in any anti-austerity protest does not 
show up as a significant predictor for any type of electoral choice.  
 
--- Table 5 about here --- 
 
In order to assess the relative influence of economic voting, blame attribution and attitudes 
towards austerity for the outcome of the regional elections and possible future behaviour in a 
general election, we conducted some further post-estimation analysis. In Table 5, we compiled 
a range of indicators of goodness of fit and relative model quality to assess the importance of 
key variables. Starting with the base model combining variables such as party identification, 
ideology and political activity as well as the basic demographics, the table displays the way 
the indicators change when we add variables relating to economic voting, blame attribution 
and government discourses. For regional elections, these results demonstrate quite 
impressively that the factors relating to the austerity crisis do not appear to have been that 
important. The pseudo-r
2 
co-efficient changes only by a few points, and particularly the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) suggests that the model including economic voting, 
blame attribution and acceptance of government discourse is not preferable to the base model. 
This analysis provides the strongest evidence that regional elections were, on the whole, 
decoupled from national politics. 
 
The picture is rather different for the analysis of voting intention. Here, the inclusion of 
economic evaluations and the acceptance of government discourse leads to a substantial 
improvements in the explanatory value of the model, while blame attribution does not play a 
role. This suggests that economic voting and attitudes to the government’s discourse on 
austerity politics are important and independent predictors, even when controlling for party 
identification and other variables associated with electoral choice.
10
 
                                                 
10
 A further consideration of how to address the endogeneity problem with cross-sectional data 
is suggested by Nezi (2012, p. 503), namely to consider the influence of endogeneity in terms 
of an omitted variable and estimate the size of the effect necessary to invalidate the findings. 
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This contrast in the determinants of vote choice between the two depended variables would 
suggest that Papandreou’s late attempt to turn the regional elections into a referendum on 
austerity by adopting particular security rhetoric of existential threats was unsuccessful. At 
most, austerity variables played only a marginal role in swaying voters to support PASOK. 
The regional poll of 2010 does not fit either the model of a ‘second order’ election or that of a 
‘national referendum’-type ‘first order’ election very neatly. This would suggest that apart 
from traditional predictors of PASOK support such as party identification, trade union 
membership and education, a substantial share of the variance in vote choice must be due to 
other factors, such as the specific qualities of individual candidates and regional conditions, or 
other variables not accounted for in our survey. Our model is thus is far better suited to 
explain voting intention in a national election rather than voting in the regional elections. 
 
--- Figures 1 and 2 about here --- 
 
Where does this leave the role of acceptance and rejection of the government’s security 
discourse on electoral behaviour, which has been the central focus of our analysis? In order to 
assess the importance of this discourse variable more thoroughly, we analysed the predicted 
probability of voting PASOK. Figures 1 and 2 plot the relationship between the probability of 
voting for PASOK and the acceptance of the austerity discourse, holding constant (at their 
mean) all other variables included in the binary logistic regressions displayed in Tables 3 and 
4 (Column 2). Once again, the results are quite revealing, confirming the earlier picture. For 
regional elections (Figure 1), there is a positive relationship between the probability of voting 
PASOK and accepting the government discourse, as was suggested by the regression analysis. 
However, the graph shows the weakness of that relationship, with a fairly flat curve and a 
widening confidence interval towards the higher end of the acceptance range. By contrast, the 
curve is leading fairly steeply upwards in the case of the probability of expressing an intention 
to vote PASOK in a general election (Figure 2). 
 
These results underline the importance of assessing the impact of austerity discourses as an 
independent predictor for vote choice at times of economic crisis. This variable made a 
statistically significant, if only minor, overall contribution to the support received by PASOK 
in the 2010 elections – hardly enough to justify an interpretation of the 2010 as confirming 
public support for the government’s austerity programme. In voters’ minds at the end of 2010 
was, however, a clear relationship between attitudes to the government discourse and the 
decision to support PASOK or not in national electoral politics. Defection from PASOK is 
strongly related to rejection of the government’s discourse. Subsequent events appear to 
suggest that the party was unable to cope with the political challenge posed by this 
relationship. 
                                                                                                                                                         
In Nezi’s case, she considered it unlikely that an odds ratio of 1.8 for the effect of an 
economic voting variable, controlling for party identification, ideology and socio-demographic 
variables, would be due to endogeneity effects. In our case, the odds ratio for the effect of the 
acceptance of government discourses on voting PASOK in a general election, with a similar 
range of control variables, is 2.7, thus suggesting that is should be even more unlikely to be 
the result of an endogeneity effect.  
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Conclusion 
Despite a high level of protest, the 2010 regional elections appeared to suggest that the 
PASOK government was doing quite well to maintain a sufficient level of support, against the 
norm of seeing incumbents punished at times of economic downturn and unpopular reforms. 
Our analysis of survey data of voting behaviour, however, poses considerable doubts about the 
interpretation of the regional vote as an expression of support for the government’s austerity 
policy. To understand the importance of the 2010 result and its implications, we need to 
consider its contested character as a first or second order election by comparing the 
determinants of vote choice between our two dependent variables, namely recalled vote in the 
regional elections and vote intention in a future national election. 
 
For voting in the regional elections, economic evaluations were of little importance, while a 
combination of not blaming governments but Greek civil society and acceptance of the 
government’s political discourse were significant predictors of support for PASOK. The 
government party lost a lot of support, which is in line with the theory of ‘second order 
elections’, but otherwise Greek voters did not behave as expected, particularly since economic 
evaluations appear to have been irrelevant for voting choice. On the other hand, for voting 
intention in a future general election, the role of economic evaluations and blame attribution 
were reversed, with attitudes to the government’s rhetoric found to be even more important. 
These distinct differences in the drivers of vote between the two variables demonstrate that 
Papandreou was unsuccessful in his attempt to turn the 2010 election into a referendum on 
austerity. 
 
Furthermore, our analysis of the 2010 regional result reveals significant weaknesses in 
PASOK’s support base. The party had lost a substantial number of voters compared with the 
general elections of 2009 but few of them switched to other parties, perhaps because of their 
inability to provide a convincing alternative at that time. Those voters rejected the 
government’s policies but were not quite sure where to turn next. The ultimate destination of 
the ‘undecided’ is obviously unclear without panel data. However, the fact that this group of 
former PASOK voters firmly rejected the government’s austerity discourse suggests that the 
party by the end of 2010 was already facing major problems in winning them back. The cracks 
in PASOK’s popularity, which contributed to its eventual collapse in the double Parliamentary 
elections of May/June 2012, were thus evident, despite claiming victory following the 2010 
regional result and interpreting it to indicate confirmation of support for its austerity policies. 
 
What are the theoretical implications of our analysis for our understanding of the electoral 
politics of extreme austerity more generally? We could find some support for the theory of 
economic voting, as egocentric and prospective evaluations made a difference, at least for 
voting intentions. On the contrary, blame attribution variables were not as successful as 
predicted, despite being identified in the literature as crucial conditioning factors of economic 
voting. A major reason for this could be found in the structure of public perceptions relating to 
the austerity crisis. Our results on the dimensions of public attitudes to austerity suggest that 
the perception of ‘unfairness’ is extremely widespread in the population but does not appear to 
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have any impact on electoral behaviour. Also, blame for the economic crisis attributed to 
foreign actors, such as the EU, Germany or the IMF, did not feature at all as predictors of 
voting choice. The lack of political impact of these two main elements of the opposition 
discourse must be seen as surprising. Other forms of blame attribution played only a minor 
role. The role of blame attribution in the politics of extreme austerity may thus have to be 
revised.  
 
Crucially, our analysis underlines the importance of persuasion as ‘the key currency of crisis 
management’ (Hart and Tindall, 2009, p. 23). Our result that acceptance and rejection of the 
government’s security discourse was an independent predictor of voting behaviour for both 
regional and national elections is a significant finding. As this variable thus contributes to an 
explanation of voting choice in Greece, it needs to be taken account of – alongside economic 
evaluations and blame attribution - in any future analysis of the electoral fortunes of 
governments facing the electorate after implementing extreme austerity policies. 
 
On the whole, a comparative implication from the Greek case is that the relative success of 
PASOK in 2010 was not a reflection of a successful government strategy which could be seen 
as a model for other countries to follow when confronted with similar economic challenges. 
Although acceptance of the government discourse made a – small – contribution to the 
PASOK vote, factors relating to the evaluation of the austerity crisis were not that important in 
the overall analysis. This suggests that while there was considerable doubt about the position 
of the government, no compelling alternative narrative had yet been established in the mind of 
many voters. Ultimately, voting in 2010 was not so much a question of blame and punishment 
as of uncertainty and indecision - the voter did not seem ready to come out firmly on one side 
or another of the austerity debate. 
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Table 1: Allocation of ‘Blame’ for Economic Crisis among 2009 PASOK voters (Principal Component Analysis)* 
 
Q. Who is to blame for the crisis? How 
responsible for the crisis would you say each of 
the following is? 
(Scale: 1 Not at all responsible, 2 Slightly 
responsible, 3 Somewhat responsible, 4 
Moderately responsible, 5 Extremely responsible 
– mean in parentheses) 
 
Factor 1 
(Foreign actors) 
Factor 2 
(Greek governments) 
Factor 3 
(Greek civil society) 
The current PASOK government (3.21) .1300 .7526 -.1276 
The previous ND government (3.91) .0781 .7409 .2606 
The European Union (3.23) .7454 .2792 .0278 
Germany (3.39) .7325 .2657 -.0288 
The Greek Banks (3.53) .4998 .2914 .3600 
Foreign investors/speculators (3.89) .6430 -.0144 .2814 
The European Currency (EURO) (2.83) .5841 -.0156 .0036 
Globalisation (3.22) .6598 .0051 -.0078 
Corruption in Greece (4.58) .0736 .3039 .6463 
Each and every one of us (3.24) .0166 -.1540 .7840 
    
Eigenvalue 3.05 1.22 1.08 
% of Variance (cumulative) 30.5 42.7 53.5 
N 1041 
 
 Cell entries are rotated factor loadings; principal component analysis, Varimax rotation (orthogonal), with Kaiser 
normalization; coefficients > .6 or < -.6 highlighted; Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy: .7796 (overall).  
22 
Table 2: Attitudes to Economic Crisis among 2009 PASOK voters (Principal Component Analysis)* 
 
Q. I will read out some things that people 
have said about the economic measures. To 
what extent do you agree or disagree with 
each of them?  
(Scale 1 Strongly disagree, 2 Disagree, 3 
Neither agree or disagree, 4 Agree, 5 
Strongly agree – mean in parentheses) 
 
Factor 1 
(Acceptance of Government 
Discourse) 
Factor 2 
(Fatalism) 
Factor 3 
(Unfairness) 
The austerity measures are necessary for our 
national survival (2.95) 
.8252 .0394 .0201 
The burden of the measures is not distributed 
fairly to all citizens (4.26) 
-.0233 -.0005 .9816 
If another party was in power, the austerity 
package would be less severe (2.25) 
-.3585 .2000 -.0709 
The government had no option but to 
introduce these measures (2.76) 
.7933 .2316 -.0673 
People should protest against these measures 
(3.65) 
-.7068 .0487 .2055 
The crisis can be seen as an opportunity for 
Greece to move forward (3.23) 
.6308 -.1923 .0829 
There is nothing anybody can do to solve 
Greece’s economic crisis (2.26) 
-.0200 .9565 .0167 
    
Eigenvalue 2.35 1.06 1.00 
% of Variance (cumulative) 33.6 48.7 63.0 
N 1041 
 
 Cell entries are rotated factor loadings; principal component analysis, Varimax rotation (orthogonal), with Kaiser 
normalization; coefficients > .6 or < .6 highlighted; Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy: .7519 (overall). 
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Table 3: Determinants of Electoral Choice, Regional Elections, November 2010 (Binary and Multinomial Logistic Regression 
Models)* 
 
 
 
Reference: 
Non-PASOK voters 
(Binary Logistic Regressions) 
Reference: PASOK voters 
(Multinomial Logistic Regression) 
Voted  
PASOK 
 
 
 
(1) 
Voted PASOK 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
Voted 
New 
Democracy 
(ND) 
 
(3) 
Voted  
Far Left 
(KKE, 
SYRIZA or 
DIMAR 
(4) 
Voted  
Independent/ 
Other party 
 
 
(5) 
Did not vote/ 
invalid vote 
 
 
 
(6) 
Economic Voting       
Retrospective personal 
economic evaluation 
(much worse than 12 
months ago) 
1.041 
(.208) 
1.062 
(.239) 
1.623 
(.475) 
.363* 
(.143) 
.770 
(.293) 
.912 
(.233) 
Prospective national 
economic evaluation 
(much worse in 12 
months) 
.548*** 
(.107) 
.693 
(.166) 
1.094 
(.346) 
1.165 
(.474) 
1.677 
(.576) 
1.596 
(.419) 
       
Blame Attribution       
Blame: Foreign Actors 
(EU, Germany etc.) 
1.054 
(.117) 
.914 
(.122) 
1.167 
(.199) 
.916 
(.179) 
.931 
(.198) 
1.073 
(.157) 
Blame: Greek 
Governments  
.748** 
(.075) 
.652*** 
(.077) 
1.200 
(.178) 
2.251*** 
(.413) 
.925 
(.145) 
1.633*** 
(.172) 
Blame: Greek civil 
society (everyone, 
corruption) 
1.247* 
(.112) 
1.201 
(.119) 
.748* 
(.101) 
1.120 
(.200) 
.801 
(.123) 
.826 
(.093) 
       
24 
Attitudes to Economic 
Crisis 
      
Acceptance of 
Government Discourse 
2.126*** 
(.258) 
1.427* 
(.215) 
.699 
(.129) 
.615* 
(.135) 
.939 
(.207) 
.680* 
(.117) 
Fatalism 1.076 
(.104) 
1.025 
(.125) 
.879 
(.133) 
.809 
(.158) 
.794 
(.140) 
1.052 
(.141) 
Unfairness .925 
(.086) 
.947 
(.101) 
1.176 
(.156) 
1.049 
(.166) 
1.017 
(.161) 
1.018 
(.117) 
       
Controls       
Strength of Party 
Identification – PASOK  
- 3.242*** 
(.660) 
.195*** 
(.077) 
.285*** 
(.088) 
.405** 
(.118) 
.334*** 
(.083) 
Strength of Party 
Identification – ND  
- .283** 
(.104) 
6.047*** 
(2.354) 
1.556 
(1.061) 
1.909 
(1.084) 
2.082 
(.848) 
Strength of Party 
Identification – 
KKE/SYRIZA 
- .560* 
(.142) 
5.77e-06*** 
(3.52e-06) 
4.770*** 
(1.587) 
.794 
(.466) 
.918 
(.291) 
       
Age - 1.010 
(.007) 
.987 
(.009) 
.998 
(.010) 
.991 
(.010) 
.990 
(.008) 
Gender (male) - 1.025 
(.222) 
934 
(.260) 
1.080 
(.396) 
1.398 
(.504) 
.926 
(.221) 
Education (university) - .506** 
(.117) 
1.070 
(.327) 
2.699* 
(1.117) 
1.413 
(.499) 
2.187** 
(.567) 
Left-wing - 1.133 
(.292) 
.323** 
(.128) 
2.047 
(.811) 
1.261 
(.532) 
.921 
(.251) 
Political Interest (high) - 1.127 
(.124) 
1.009 
(.142) 
1.168 
(.220) 
1.279 
(.194) 
.761* 
(.090) 
Union Member in 
Household 
- 2.049* 
(.598) 
.326** 
(.136) 
.869 
(.382) 
.814 
(.358) 
.403** 
(.136) 
Taken part in anti-
austerity protest (2010) 
- 1.082 
(.246) 
.690 
(.208) 
1.689 
(.696) 
1.410 
(.531) 
.840 
(.206) 
       
25 
Constant .274*** 
(.036) 
.093*** 
(.037) 
2.516 
(1.428) 
.149* 
(.115) 
.127** 
(.080) 
9.644*** 
(4.036) 
    
Log pseudolikelihood -390.948 -302.367 -826.930 
McKelvey and Zavoina’s  
(Pseudo-) r
2
 
.268 .515 - 
Cragg-Uhler (Nagelkerke) 
(Pseudo-) r
2
 
.222 .457 .615 
N 902 899 883 
 
 Cell entries are odds ratios (columns 1 and 2) and relative risk ratios (Columns 3-6); robust standard errors in parentheses; tests 
of statistical significance: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001; data weighted to account for misallocations based on actual regional 
election results. 
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Table 4: Determinants of Voting Intention in Next General Election, December 2010 (Binary and Multinomial Logistic Regressions)* 
 
 
 
Reference: 
Voting Intention: Not-PASOK 
(Binary Logistic Regressions) 
Reference: Voting intention PASOK 
(Multinomial Logistic Regression) 
Voting 
intention: 
PASOK 
 
 
 
(1) 
Voting 
intention: 
PASOK 
 
 
 
(2) 
Voting 
Intention: 
New 
Democracy 
(ND) 
 
(3) 
Voting 
intention: 
Far Left 
(KKE, 
SYRIZA or 
DIMAR) 
(4) 
Voting 
Intention: 
Undecided 
 
 
 
(5) 
Voting 
intention:  
Will not vote/ 
invalid vote 
 
 
(6) 
Economic Voting       
Retrospective personal 
economic evaluation 
(much worse than 12 
months ago) 
.494** 
(.122) 
.399** 
(.135) 
2.663* 
(1.197) 
1.309 
(.567) 
2.930** 
(1.039) 
2.539** 
(.901) 
Prospective national 
economic evaluation 
(much worse in 12 
months) 
.291*** 
(.069) 
.310*** 
(.095) 
4.837** 
(2.277) 
3.116** 
(1.257) 
2.428** 
(.820) 
3.711*** 
(1.216) 
       
Blame Attribution       
Blame: Foreign Actors 
(EU, Germany etc.) 
1.138 
(.122) 
.977 
(.125) 
1.136 
(.264) 
.865 
(.159) 
1.040 
(.151) 
1.090 
(.147) 
Blame: Greek 
Governments  
.833 
(.092) 
.789 
(.106) 
.859 
(.175) 
1.301 
(.232) 
1.142 
(.168) 
1.421* 
(.210) 
Blame: Greek civil 
society (everyone, 
corruption) 
1.195 
(.136) 
1.081 
(.154) 
.797 
(.164) 
1.015 
(.198) 
.847 
(.133) 
.995 
(.152) 
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Attitudes to Economic 
Crisis 
      
Acceptance of 
Government Discourse 
4.247*** 
(.606) 
2.696*** 
(.485) 
.231*** 
(.063) 
.317*** 
(.080) 
.393*** 
(.077) 
.385*** 
(.074) 
Fatalism 1.141 
(.139) 
1.136 
(.198) 
.983 
(.232) 
.786 
(.174) 
.850 
(.158) 
.933 
(.166) 
Unfairness .829 
(.091) 
.936 
(.126) 
1.285 
(.263) 
.987 
(.175) 
1.061 
(.157) 
1.086 
(.152) 
       
Controls       
Strength of Party 
Identification – PASOK  
- 4.327*** 
(.620) 
.260** 
(.104) 
.291*** 
(.080) 
.295*** 
(.045) 
.186*** 
(.038) 
Strength of Party 
Identification – ND  
- .249* 
(.162) 
13.493** 
(10.387) 
2.630 
(2.247) 
3.564 
(2.759) 
2.283 
(1.739) 
Strength of Party 
Identification – 
KKE/SYRIZA 
- .732 
(.414) 
.00003*** 
(.00002) 
3.526 
(2.520) 
.549 
(.430) 
.555 
(.394) 
       
Age - .995 
(.008) 
1.012 
(.012) 
1.005 
(.011) 
1.012 
(.009) 
.997 
(.009) 
Gender (male) - .785 
(.207) 
1.288 
(.537) 
1.276 
(.493) 
1.273 
(.367) 
1.206 
(.341) 
Education (university) - .771 
(.200) 
1.993 
(.883) 
1.201 
(.469) 
1.434 
(.418) 
1.235 
(.342) 
Left-wing - 1.037 
(.317) 
.040*** 
(.030) 
2.534* 
(1.010) 
.750 
(.251) 
.949 
(.308) 
Political Interest (high) - 1.411** 
(.185) 
.813 
(.160) 
1.140 
(.212) 
.813 
(.117) 
.557*** 
(.079) 
Union Member in 
Household 
- .778 
(.356) 
.630 
(.423) 
1.234 
(.677) 
1.566 
(.752) 
.815 
(.394) 
Taken part in anti-
austerity protest (2010) 
- .669 
(.248) 
1.389 
(.737) 
1.636 
(.771) 
1.543 
(.624) 
1.311 
(.503) 
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Constant 2.071*** 
(.035) 
.079*** 
(.039) 
.234 
(.201) 
.224* 
(.161) 
1.754** 
(.954) 
17.378** 
(9.448) 
Log pseudolikelihood -316.520 -211.453 -852.521 
McKelvey and Zavoina’s  
(Pseudo-) r
2
 
.546 .718 - 
Cragg-Uhler (Nagelkerke) 
(Pseudo-) r
2
 
.430 .660 .721 
N 999 996 946 
 
 Cell entries are odds ratios (columns 1 and 2) and relative risk ratios (Columns 3-6); robust standard errors in parentheses; tests 
of statistical significance: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001; data weighted to account for misallocations based on actual regional 
election results. 
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Table 5: Evaluation of Logistic Regression Models of PASOK Support* 
 
 Regional Elections 
(recalled vote) 
General Elections 
(voting intention) 
Pseudo-r
2
 AIC BIC Pseudo-r
2
 AIC BIC 
Base model 
(Party Identification, 
Ideology and 
Demographics) 
.449 669.761 722.575 .575 543.257 597.199 
+ Economic Voting .468 662.798 725.214 .659 493.399 557.148 
+Blame attribution .504 644.500 721.320 .669 489.072 567.532 
+Acceptance of 
Government Discourse 
.515 642.733 733.958 .718 460.906 554.078 
 
*Cell entries include: Pseudo-r
2
 = McKelvey and Zavoina’s r2; AIC: Aikaike’s Information Criterion; BIC: Bayesian Information 
Criterion (both AIC and BIC are reported in the version as ‘used by STATA’, cf. Long and Freese, 2006, pp. 110-113). The higher the 
pseudo-r
2
 (range 0 to 1), the better the model fit, and the lower AIC/BIC, the better the model; differences in BIC of less than 2 
constitute only weak evidence to prefer one model over another; differences of 10 or higher provide very strong evidence. 
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Figure 1: Predicted Probability of Voting PASOK in Regional Elections in relation to Acceptance of Government Discourse 
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Figure 2: Predicted Probability of Voting Intention PASOK in a future General Election in relation to Acceptance of Government 
Discourse 
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APPENDIX 
 
Documentation of Variables Used
11
  
 
Dependent Variables 
 
- Voting Regional Elections 
Q. Many people did not vote in the local and regional elections of November 2010 whereas 
others voted. Did you vote in the recent elections or not?  
(1) Yes I voted (2) No I didn’t vote 
IF YES 
Which party supported the candidates you voted for in the first round of the regional elections on 
7 November, or maybe there were independent candidates?  
(List of Parties) 
 
- Voting Intention General Elections 
Q. Lastly, if there were a national election this Sunday, which party would you vote for?  
(List of Parties, Blank/Spoilt Vote, Will not vote, Undecided/don’t know) 
 
 [Recoded: 0 other voters and non-voters 1 voting intention for specific party] 
 
Independent Variables 
 
- Financial situation –last twelve months 
Q. Compared to a year ago, your financial situation is … 
1. Much worse, 2 A bit worse, 3 About the same 4. A bit better, 5. Much better 
[Recoded as: 
0 Much better/A bit better/About the same/A bit worse 1 Much worse] 
 
- Economic situation over future 12 months 
Q. How do you think the economy will be in 12 months?  
 
1. Much worse, 2 A bit worse, 3 About the same 4. A bit better, 5. Much better 
[Recoded as: 
0 Much better/A bit better/About the same/A bit worse 1 Much worse] 
 
- Blame Attribution and Attitudes to Economic Crisis: See Tables 3 and 4.  
 
- Strength of Party Identification (PASOK and other parties) 
Q.: Is there a particular party you feel closer to than all the other parties? 
No, Yes 
                                                 
11
 In order to avoid the major loss of cases through listwise deletion in the regression models 
reported in Tables 5 and 6, non-response, where possible, was coded as a middle/neutral 
response or as mean (for age). All regressions were run with or without the application of this 
policy, and no significant differences in the results were found. 
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If Yes: Which one?  
How close do you feel to this party? Do you feel you are  
1. very close, 2. quite close, 3. Not very close 
[Recoded as: 
0 no party identification, 1 yes but not very close, 2 Yes quite close 3 Yes very close] 
 
- Age 
In which year were you born?  
[Age computed as 2010-year of birth] 
 
- Gender 
What is your gender?  1. Male 2. Female 
[Recoded Female 0 Male 1] 
 
 
- Education 
 
Q.: What level of education have you completed or are currently studying for? (1) Primary 
school, (2) Secondary (3 years), (3) Secondary, Lyceum (6 years), (4) Post-secondary 
trade/vocational school; (5) University, undergraduate, (6) University, postgraduate), (7) Nothing 
[Recoded as: 0 Nothing to Post-secondary trade/vocational school, 1 University, undergraduate 
and postgraduate] 
 
- Left-wing 
Q. In politics people sometimes talk of ‘left’ and ‘right’. Where would you place yourself on this 
0-10 scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?  
0 Left – 10 Right 
[Recoded: 
0 5-10 1 0-4 (all positions left of the middle point, 5;  
as item non-response was quite high, an attempt was made to enter a value for the left-right scale 
for these missing cases on the basis of two attitude questions which have generally been regarded 
as providing a good approximation of left-right position: 
Q. It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people 
with high income and those with low incomes 
Q. Private enterprise is the best way to solve Greece’s economic problems 
(Scale: 1 Strongly disagree, 2 Disagree, 3 Neither agree of disagree, 4 Agree, 5 Strongly agree).  
Those who take a position of either/or pro-redistribution and anti-private enterprise and do not 
take a anti-distribution and pro-private enterprise position are coded 1 (left wing), others are 
coded 0 (centre right); 3 cases with no response on either question were coded as missing. ] 
 
- Political Interest 
Q. How interested are you in politics? 
1 Very interested, 2 Somewhat interested, 3 Not very interested, 4 Not at all interested 
[Recoded as: 
0 Not at all interested, 1 Not very interested, 2 Somewhat interested, 3 Very interested] 
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- Union Member in Household 
Q. Are you yourself or anyone else in your household a member of any of the following 
organisations?  
a. Trade Union or Labour Organisation  
1. Yes I am 2 Yes someone else is 3. Yes both me and someone else are 4 No 
[Recoded as: 
0 No 1 Yes I am/Yes someone else is/Yes both me and someone else 
 
- Taken Part in Anti-Austerity Protest 
Q. In protest against the austerity measures.. 
a) Have there been strikes in the town or community where you live? (1) No (2) Yes 
b) If so, have you taken part in any of these strikes? (1) No (2) Yes 
c) Have there been any demonstrations in the town or community where you live? (1) No (2) Yes 
d) If so, have you taken party in any of these demonstrations?  
e) Did you take part in any demonstrations outside your town or community?  
 
[Recoded as: (0) not taken part in any strikes or demonstrations (1) taken part in either strikes or 
demonstrations or both 
 
 
